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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable
utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are
unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the
resulting family of games, we propose the notion of “robust
CORE”. Our main contribution is to design two distributed
algorithms, namely, distributed payoff allocation and distributed
bargaining, that converge to a consensual payoff distribution in
the robust CORE. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to
show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying
communication networks. An energy storage optimization appli-
cation motivates our framework for “robust coalitional games”.
I. INTRODUCTION
COALITIONAL game theory provides a framework tostudy the behavior of selfish and rational agents when
they cooperate effectively. This willingness to cooperate arise
from the aspiration of gaining a higher return, compared to
that for behaving as individuals [1].
Specifically, a transferable utility (TU) coalitional game con-
sists of a set of agents and a value/characteristic function
that provides the value of each of the possible coalitions [1].
Multi-agent decision problems modelled by TU coalitional
games arise in many application areas, such as demand-side
energy management [2], in power networks for transmission
cost allocation [3] and cooperation between microgrids [4],
in various areas of communication networks [5] and as the
foundation of coalitional control [6].
One key problem studied by coalitional game theory is the
distribution of the value generated by cooperation. Along
this research direction, several solution concepts have been
proposed with special attention to criteria like stability and
fairness. In payoff distribution, stability means that none of
the agents has an incentive to defect the coalition. Perhaps
the most studied solution concepts in coalitional games that
ensures the stability of a payoff is the CORE. The second
criterion, i.e., fairness means that the payoff for an agent
should reflect its contribution to or impact in the game. A
seminal work on the axiomatic characterization of fairness
is that of Shapley [7], where the unique value satisfying the
fairness axioms is in fact known as the Shapley value which
depends on the marginal contribution of each agent. The later
depicts the impact each agent has on the collective value of the
coalition. Other related solution concepts are also proposed in
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the literature, e.g. the Nucleolus [8] and the Kernel [9].
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a payoff
distribution that encourages cooperation, i.e., belongs to the
CORE [10]. Now, to evaluate such a payoff, the value of
each possible coalition is required, which seems implausible in
many practical applications, mainly because an agent cannot
be certain about the values that collaborations may generate.
However, one can assume that an agent does hold a belief
about the value of some possible collaborations via informed
estimation or mere experience. In practice, this brings uncer-
tainty to the coalitional values and, consequently, to the CORE
set. It follows that one should consider solutions that are robust
to uncertainty on the coalitional values. In this paper, we do
that via the notion of robust CORE.
The robustness aspect in coalitional games falls into the
framework of dynamic TU coalitional games, which has been
studied in the literature. Among others, the authors in [11]
analyzed the time consistency of the Shapley value and the
CORE under the temporal evolution of the game. Then, the
authors in [12] characterized three versions of CORE alloca-
tions for a dynamic game where the worth of the coalitions
varies over time according to the previous allocations. In both
papers, the coalitional values at the current time are determined
endogenously and depend on previous events.
On the other hand, robust coalitional games are the subclass of
dynamic TU coalitional games where the coalitional values are
unknown and exogenous [13], [14]. In [15], Bauso and Timmer
characterized robust allocation rules for the dynamic coali-
tional game where the average value of each coalition is known
with certainty, while at each instant, the coalitional value
fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. The static version of
their setup, called cooperative interval games, is presented by
the authors in [16], where the coalitional values are considered
yet to be uncertain within some bounded intervals. Within
the setup of interval games, they have introduced the interval
solutions, which assign a closed real interval as a payoff to
each agent instead of a single real value. In [17], Nedich and
Bauso have presented a distributed bargaining algorithm for
finding a solution in the CORE under the framework of robust
coalitional games and dynamic average games. Inspired by the
motivation of cooperative interval games and the setup in [17],
in this paper, we consider the value generated by each coalition
to vary within certain bounds.
Motivational example: Let us consider the energy optimization
application inspired by [18] which justifies a dynamic robust
coalitional game model. Consider a group of N prosumers,
each of whom owns a renewable energy source (RES) and
energy storage (ES). Together they form an energy coalition
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2I where the participating agents operate their ES systems
collectively to minimize their total energy cost. When the
energy coalition has an excess of energy, they can store it in an
ES for later utilization and any additional energy can be sold
to a retailer. The retailer buys energy and remunerates, a few
hours ahead of the delivery time. The coalition considers the
corresponding remuneration for optimizing their ES operation
and consequently minimizing the associated cost function.
Now, the cost saving as a result of the collaborative operation
should be distributed in such a way that each prosumer is
satisfied by its share, and hence the coalition remains intact. To
achieve this, the agents assert their position by presenting the
estimated cost saving of possible energy sub-coalitions, S ⊆ I,
which they could have been part of and use them to define
acceptable payoffs, namely payoffs in the CORE. Since there
is uncertainty in the RES generation, the cost savings, v(S), of
each sub-coalition S ⊆ I is uncertain. How the agents share
this saving under such uncertainty is a part of the solution
generated by an iterative payoff distribution methods.
Let bti represent the charge or discharge of energy by the ES
of prosumer i at time t. Further, denote the net energy demand
of prosumer i by qti and let p
t
s and p
t
b be an electricity sell
price and buy price at time t, respectively. Then, the energy
cost function of any energy sub-coalition S ⊆ I for a time
period of length K is given as:
FS(b) :=
∑K
t=1
{
ptb
( ∑
i∈S proj≥0(q
t
i + b
t
i)
)
+pts
(∑
i∈S proj≤0(q
t
i + b
t
i)
)}
,
where b ∈ RNK contains the ES charge and discharge profiles
of all the N agents over the K time steps.
For a given coalition S, the coalitional energy cost for the time
period of length K is defined as:
cK(S) := min
b
FS(b), (1)
and the cost saving during this period, vK(S), as the difference
between the sum of the costs of the coalitions of the individual
agents in S and the cost of the coalition itself, namely,
vK(S) :=
∑
i∈S{cKi } − cK(S). (2)
Note that, the cost c(S) is unknown but bounded, from
above when each agent i ∈ S has RES generation equal
to the installed capacity, which gives minimum value of net
energy consumption qmini for the whole period K, and from
below when there is no generation, hence qmaxi . Due to these
bounds, the cost saving vK(S) is also bounded. Let c(S) be
the coalitional cost corresponding to qmaxi , and let ci be the
individual cost corresponding to qmini , i ∈ S then:
vK(S) ≤∑i∈S{ci} − c(S).
The uniform upper bound on the coalitional values and the
fixed value of grand coalition, for a period of length K, allows
us to consider the setup of robust games presented in [17].
Contribution: We propose two payoff distribution algorithms
within the framework of robust coalitional games where the
values of the coalitions are time-varying:
• We introduce the notion of robust CORE, a set of payoffs
that stabilizes a grand coalition under variations in the
coalitional values;
• We develop a distributed payoff allocation algorithm
where agents communicate only locally, i.e., with their
neighbors, over a time-varying and repeatedly-connected
communication network. We show that the proposed
algorithm converges to the common payoff allocation in
the robust CORE;
• We present a distributed bargaining protocol and prove its
convergence to a mutually agreed payoff, which belongs
to the robust CORE. We consider similar communication
requirements for the bargaining protocol as for the allo-
cation process; however, the bargaining protocol requires
agents to have less information about the game;
• We establish convergence of the proposed algorithms
using tools from operator theory (paracontraction, non-
expansive operators and Krasnoselskii-Mann fixed-point
iterations) which allows us to generalize existing results
and in turn to propose faster algorithms.
Organization of the paper: In Section II, we provide the
mathematical background and formal definitions of dynamic
TU coalitional games. In Section III and IV, we present
a distributed payoff allocation algorithm and a distributed
bargaining protocol, along with their convergence results, re-
spectively. In Section V, we report the results of our numerical
simulations and in Section VI we conclude the paper.
Notation: R and N denote the set of real and natural numbers,
respectively. Given a mapping M : Rn → Rn,fix(M) :=
{x ∈ Rn | x = M(x)} denote the set of fixed points. Id
denotes the identity operator. For a closed set C ⊆ Rn, the
mapping projC : Rn → C denotes the projection onto C, i.e.,
projC(x) = arg miny∈C ‖y−x‖. An over-projection operator
is denoted by overprojC := 2projC − Id. For a set S the
power set is denoted by 2S . A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker
product between the matrices A and B. IN denotes an identity
matrix of dimension N ×N . For a norm ‖ · ‖p on Rn and a
norm ‖ · ‖q on Rm, the mixed vector norm ‖ · ‖p,q on Rmn
is defined as ‖x‖p,q = ‖col(‖x1‖p, · · · , ‖xm‖p)‖q . dist(x,C)
denotes the distance of x from a closed set C ⊆ Rn, i.e.,
dist(x,C) := infy∈C‖y − x‖.
operator-theoretic definitions: A mapping T : Rn → Rn is
nonexpansive, if ‖T (x)−T (y)‖ ≤ ‖x−y‖, for all x, y ∈ Rn.
A continuous mapping M : Rn → Rn is a paracontraction,
with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ on Rn, if ‖M(x)−y‖ < ‖x−y‖,
for all x, y ∈ Rn such that x /∈ fix(M), y ∈ fix(M).
II. BACKGROUND ON COALITIONAL GAMES
Let us first provide a brief mathematical background on
coalitional game theory and then describe two payoff distribu-
tion processes namely, the payoff allocation and bargaining.
In dynamic context, a coalitional game consists of a set of
agents, indexed by I = {1, . . . , N}, who cooperate to achieve
selfish interests. This cooperation at each time k ∈ N results
in the generation of utility, as defined by a value function vk.
Definition 1 (Coalitional game): Let I = {1, . . . , N} be a
set of agents. For each time k ∈ N, an instantaneous coalitional
3game is a pair Gk = (I, vk) where vk : 2I → R is a value
function that assigns a real value, vk(S), to each coalition S ⊆
I. A dynamic coalitional game is a sequence of instantaneous
games, i.e., G = (I, (vk)k∈N). 
For an instantaneous game, an instantaneous value of a
coalition has to be distributed among the member agents of
the coalition so that each agent receives a certain payoff.
Definition 2 (Payoff vector): Let I = {1, . . . , N} be a
set of agents and S ⊆ I be a coalition in an instantaneous
coalitional game Gk = (I, vk), k ∈ N. Then, for each i ∈ S,
the element xki of a payoff vector x
k ∈ R|S| represents the
share of agent i of the value vk(S). 
Within the game, we assume that each agent i ∈ I acts
rationally and efficiently. This means that the payoff vector,
given in Definition 2, proposed by an agent must belong to its
bounding set as defined next.
Definition 3 (Bounding set ([17], Sec. II-B )): For an
instantaneous game Gk = (I, vk), k ∈ N, the set
X ki :=
{
x ∈ RN | ∑j∈I xj = vk(I),∑
j∈S xj ≥ vk(S),∀S ⊂ I s.t. i ∈ S
}
(3)
denotes the bounding set of an agent i ∈ S. 
Since an agent agrees only on a payoff vector in its bounding
set, we can conclude that a mutually agreed payoff shall belong
to the intersection of the bounding sets of all the agents.
Interestingly, this intersection corresponds to the CORE, the
solution concept that relates to the stability of a grand coali-
tion, i.e., a coalition of all agents. The idea of stability, in this
context, is based on the disinterest of each agent in defecting
a grand coalition.
Definition 4 (Instantaneous CORE): The CORE C of an
instantaneous coalitional game Gk = (I, vk), k ∈ N, is the
following set of payoff vectors:
C(vk) :=
{
x ∈ RN |∑i∈I xi = vk(I),∑
i∈S xi ≥ vk(S),∀S ⊆ I
}
,
=
⋂N
i=1 X ki ,
(4)
with X ki as in (3), which is also the intersection of the
individual bounding sets. 
Each payoff allocation that belongs to CORE stabilizes the
grand coalition, which implies that no agent or coalition S ⊂ I
has an incentive to defect from the grand coalition.
In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic coalitional games
where an instantaneous value of each coalition vk(S) belongs
to a finite set bounded by a minimum and a maximum value,
i.e., v(S) ≤ vk(S) ≤ v(S). This restriction of values, that
can be taken by vk, gives rise to a family of games which we
collectively regard as a robust coalitional game.
Definition 5 (Robust coalitional game): Let I =
{1, . . . , N} be a set of agents. A robust coalitional game
R = (I,V), is a set of instantaneous coalitional games (I, vk)
with vk ∈ V := {u1, u2, . . . , u3} for all k ∈ N, where each
uj is a value function such that u(S) ≤ uj(S) ≤ u(S) for all
S ⊆ I, and ⋂u∈V C(u) 6= ∅. 
In words, a robust coalitional game (I,V) is a family of a
finite number of instantaneous coalitional games such that the
intersection of corresponding COREs is nonempty.
We refer to the CORE of a robust coalitional game as the
robust CORE, defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Robust CORE): For a robust game R =
(I,V), the robust CORE is the set
C0 :=
⋂
v∈V C(v). (5)

Remark 1: Let R = (I,V) be a robust coalitional game.
If there exists v ∈ V such that for all k ∈ N, vk(I) =
v(I) and vk(S) ≤ v(S) for any coalition S ⊂ I, then,
C0 ⊆ C(vk) for all vk ∈ V . Consequently, if C0 6= ∅
then C(vk) 6= ∅ for all k ∈ N. This special case of robust
coalitional game is presented in [17] as a “robust game”. 
In the sequel, we deal with the grand coalition only, therefore,
we use the CORE as the solution concept. We note from (4)
that the CORE C(vk) is closed and convex, a fact that will
be utilized later. Furthermore, the robust CORE C0 in (5) is
assumed to be nonempty throughout the paper.
Next, we discuss a possible strategy for finding a payoff
vector that belongs to CORE, C0 in (5) of a robust game
R = (I,V). Since centralized methods for finding a payoff
vector x ∈ C0 do not capture realistic scenarios of interaction
among autonomous selfish agents, we propose distributed
methods that allow agents to autonomously reach a common
agreement on a payoff distribution.
The two payoff distribution methods which we focus on are
distributed payoff allocation and distributed bargaining. The
former is an iterative procedure in which, at each step, an
agent i proposes a payoff distribution xi ∈ RN by averaging
the proposals of neighboring agents and by introducing an
innovation factor. This procedure aspires to eventually reach
a mutually agreed payoff among participating agents.
In a bargaining process, to propose a payoff distribution
xi ∈ RN , an agent i, after averaging the proposals of all
agents, makes it compliant to its own interest. Just as a payoff
allocation method, bargaining procedure also aspires to reach
a mutually agreed payoff.
Thus, in both methods, the proposed payoff distributions
(xi)i∈I must eventually reach consensus.
Definition 7 (Consensus set): The consensus setA ⊂ RN2
is defined as:
A := {col(x1, . . . ,xN ) ∈ RN2 | xi = xj ,∀i, j ∈ I}. (6)

In the sequel, we consider the problem of iteratively computing
a mutually agreed, payoff vector in the CORE, i.e., xk → x¯ ∈
A ∩ CN . We address this problem via distributed algorithms
under the payoff allocation and bargaining frameworks.
III. DISTRIBUTED PAYOFF ALLOCATION
In coalitional games, the agents cooperate because they fore-
see a higher individual payoff compared to non-cooperative
actions. A payoff that can sustain such cooperation, referred
4as a stable payoff, shall satisfy the criteria in (4). Thus, the
goal of a payoff allocation process is to let the agents achieve a
consensus on a stable payoff in a distributed manner. During
the allocation process, each agent proposes a payoff for all
the involved agents based on the previous proposals of his
neighbors and an innovation term.
In this section, we propose a payoff allocation in the context
of robust coalitional games, where the value function v, at
each iteration k, takes a value within the given bounds. We
prove that even with the variation in coalitional values during
a coalitional game, the proposed payoff allocation algorithm
converges to a stable payoff distribution. In particular, our goal
is to construct a distributed fixed-point algorithm, using which
the agents can reach consensus (6) on a payoff distribution that
belongs to the robust CORE in (5).
A. Distributed payoff allocation algorithm
Consider a set of agents I = {1, . . . , N} who syn-
chronously propose a distribution of utility at each discrete
time step k ∈ N. Specifically, each agent i ∈ I proposes a
payoff distribution xki ∈ RN , where the jth element denotes
the share of agent j proposed by agent i at iteration k ∈ N.
Let the agents communicate over a time-varying network
represented by a graph Gk = (I, Ek), where (j, i) ∈ Ek
means that there is an active link between the agents i and
j at iteration k and they are then referred as neighbours.
Therefore, the set of neighbors of agent i at iteration k is
defined as N ki :=
{
j ∈ I|(i, j) ∈ Ek}. We assume that at
each iteration k an agent i observes only the proposals of its
neighbouring agents. Furthermore, we assume that the union
of the communication graphs over a time period of length Q
is connected. The following assumption is typical for many
works in multi-agent coordination, e.g. [19, Assumption 3.2].
Assumption 1 (Q−connected graph): For all k ∈ N, the
union graph (I,∪Ql=1E l+k) is strongly connected for some
integer Q ≥ 1. 
The edges in the communication graph Gk are weighted
using an adjacency matrix W k = [wki,j ], whose element
wki,j represents the weight assigned by agent i to the payoff
distribution proposed by agent j, xkj . Note that, for some j,
wki,j = 0 implies that j /∈ N ki hence, the state of agent i is
independent from that of agent j. We assume the adjacency
matrix to be doubly stochastic with positive diagonal, as
assumed in [19, Assumption 3.3], [20, Assumption 2, 3].
Assumption 2 (Stochastic adjacency matrix): For all k ≥
0, the adjacency matrix W k = [wki,j ] of the communication
graph Gk satisfies following conditions:
1) It is doubly stochastic, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 wi,j =
∑N
i=1 wi,j = 1;
2) its diagonal elements are strictly positive, i.e., wki,i >
0,∀i ∈ I;
3) ∃ γ > 0 such that wki,j ≥ γ whenever wki,j > 0. 
We further assume that the elements of communication matrix
W k take values from a finite set; it follows that, there are
finitely many adjacency matrices available.
Assumption 3 (Finitely many adjacency matrices): The
adjacency matrices {W k}k∈N, of the communication graphs
belong to W , a finite family of matrices that satisfy Assump-
tion 2, i.e., W k ∈ W for all k ∈ N. 
This assumption on the adjacency matrices allows us to exploit
important results from the literature regarding finite families
of mappings for proving convergence of our algorithms.
In our setup, at iteration k, each agent i proposes a payoff
allocation xk+1i , for all agents j ∈ I, as a convex combination
of its estimate xki and an innovation term. To generate the
latter, agent i first takes an average of the observed estimates
of its neighbors xkj , j ∈ N ki , weighted by an adjacency matrix,
and then applies an operator T ki on the evaluated average.
Specifically, we propose the following update rule for each
agent i ∈ I:
xk+1i = (1− αk)xki + αkT ki
(∑N
j=1 w
k
i,jx
k
j
)
,
that is, in collective compact form,
xk+1 = (1− αk)xk + αkT kW k(xk), (7)
where (αk)k∈N ∈ [, 1 − ] for some  ∈ (0, 1/2], T k(x) :=
col(T k1 (x1), . . . , T
k
N (xN )) and W
k := W k ⊗ IN represents
an adjacency matrix.
In (7), we require the operator T ki to be nonexpansive and its
fixed-point set to include the robust CORE in (5). For example,
T ki can be the projection onto the CORE, i.e., T
k
i = projC(vk).
Assumption 4 (Nonexpansiveness): For all k ∈ N, the op-
erator T k in (7) is such that T k ∈ T , where T is a finite family
of nonexpansive operators such that
⋂
T∈T fix(T ) = CN0 , with
C0 being the robust CORE in (5). 
Let us elaborate on this assumption in context of a robust
coalitional game R = (I,V), as in Definition 5. Here, for
all k ∈ N, we assume that an instantaneous CORE C(vk)
in (4) generated by the value function vk ∈ V is the fixed-
point set of an operator T ki for all i ∈ I which implies that
fix(T k) = CN (vk). Consequently, the intersection of the fixed-
point sets of the operators T k ∈ T corresponds to the robust
CORE in (5), i.e.,
⋂
T∈T fix(T ) =
⋂
v∈V CN (v) = CN0 . Fur-
thermore, we note that having a finite family of nonexpansive
operators implies that the value function vk can only take
finitely many values within a specified set. This limitation
does not pose a significant hindrance in practical scenarios.
First, because the number of discrete values inside bounded
intervals can be arbitrarily large and secondly, because the
most common interpretation of value is in a monetary sense,
which is always rounded off to some currency division.
Next, we assume that each T k ∈ T appears at least once
in every Q iterations of (7), with Q being the integer in
Assumption 1, which can be arbitrarily large.
Assumption 5: Let Q be the integer in Assumption 1. The
operators (T k)k∈N in (7) are such that, for all n ∈ N,⋃n+Q
k=n {T k} = T , with T as in Assumption 4. 
Under Assumptions 1−5, we can guarantee the convergence
of the state in iteration (7) to some payoff distribution in the
set A ∩ CN0 , as formalized in the following statement.
Theorem 1 (Convergence of payoff allocation): Let As-
sumptions 1−5 hold and the step sizes satisfy αk ∈ [, 1 −
] for all k ∈ N, for some  > 0. Then, the sequence
(xk)∞k=0 generated by the iteration in (7) converges to some
5x¯ ∈ A∩CN0 , with A as in (6) and C0 being the robust CORE
(5). 
B. Convergence Analysis
To prove the convergence of the payoff allocation process
in (7), we build upon a well-known result on time-varying
nonexpansive mappings, presented by Browder in [21]. To
proceed, let us first define the notion of admissible sequence
and then recall Browder’s result.
Definition 8 (Admissible sequence ([21], Def. 5)): A
function j : N>0 → D ⊆ N>0 is said to be an admissible
sequence of integers in D if for each integer r ∈ D, there
exists m(r) ∈ N>0 such that the image under the function j
of m(r) successive integers contains r, i.e., r ∈ {j(n), j(n+
1), . . . , j(n+m(r))}, for all n ∈ dom(j). 
For example, every p−periodic sequence, i.e., {jk}k∈N where
jk+p = jk, is admissible with m(r) = p for all r ∈ ran(j)
and a sequence {jk = k}k∈N is a non-admissible sequence.
Lemma 1 ([21], Thm. 5): Let (Ur)r∈D,D ⊆ N>0, be a
(finite or infinite) sequence of nonexpansive mappings such
that C =
⋂
r∈D fix (Ur) 6= ∅. Let (αk)k∈N be a sequence
where αk ∈ [, 1 − ] for some  ∈ (0, 1/2], and let (jk)k∈N
be an admissible sequence of integers in D. Then, the sequence
(xk)k∈N>0 generated by
xk+1 := (1− αk)xk + αkUjk(xk)
converges to some x¯ ∈ C. 
Next, we recall some useful properties of nonexpansive and
paracontraction operators.
Lemma 2 (Doubly stochastic matrix ([22], Prop. 5 ), ([23],
Prop. 3)): If W is a doubly stochastic matrix then, the
linear operator defined by the matrix W ⊗In is nonexpansive.
Moreover, if the operator (W ⊗ In)(·) satisfies Assumption
2 then, it is also a paracontraction with respect to the mixed
vector norm ‖ · ‖2,2. 
The fixed-point sets of nonexpansive and paracontraction
operators relate to their compositions as follows.
Lemma 3 (Composition of nonexpansive operators ([24],
Prop. 4.49)): Let T1, T2 : Rn → Rn be nonexpansive opera-
tors with respect to the norm ‖·‖. Then, the composition T1◦T2
is also nonexpansive with respect to the norm ‖·‖. Moreover, if
either T1 or T2 is a paracontraction and fix(T1)∩fix(T2) 6= ∅
then, fix(T1 ◦ T2) = fix(T1) ∩ fix(T2). 
Lemma 4 (Composition of paracontracting operators
([22], Prop. 1)): Suppose M1,M2 : Rn → Rn are para-
contractions with respect to same norm ‖ · ‖ and fix(M1) ∩
fix(M2) 6= ∅. Then, the composition M1 ◦M2 is a paracon-
traction with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖ and fix(M1 ◦M2) =
fix(M1) ∩ fix(M2). 
The Lemmas provided above are convenient operator-theoretic
tools that help us in keeping our proofs elegantly brief. Using
these tools, let us prove the following Lemma which we exploit
later in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 5: Let T 1, . . . ,T q be a set of nonexpansive opera-
tors with
⋂q
r=1 fix(T r) = C. Let the composition of the adja-
cency matrices that satisfy Assumption 2, i.e., WqWq−1 · · ·W1
represent a strongly connected graph. Let W r := Wr ⊗ IN .
Fig. 1: Illustration of the payoff allocation proposed by an
agent i, as in (8) where yˆki := overprojC(vk)xˆ
k
i .
Then,
⋂q
r=1 fix(T rW r) = A ∩ C, where A is the consensus
set in (6). 
Proof: By Lemmas 2 and 3, fix(T rW r) = fix(T r) ∩
fix(W r) hence,
⋂q
r=1 fix(T rW r) = fix(T r)∩fix(W r)∩· · ·∩
fix(T 1) ∩ fix(W 1). By Lemmas 2 and 4,
⋂q
r=1 fix(W r) =
fix(W q · · ·W 1) where, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem,
fix(W q · · ·W 1) = A. Since
⋂q
r=1 fix(T r) = C, we conclude
that
⋂q
r=1 fix(T rW r) = A ∩ C.
Given these preliminary results, we are now ready to present
the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: (Theorem 1). Let us define the operator Uf :=
T fW f with T f ∈ T and Wf ∈ W , where W f := Wf ⊗IN .
We note that, by Assumptions 3 and 4 there are only finitely
many such operators and therefore, we can define the operator
family U := {Uf}Ff=1. Let l : U → N be a function such
that l(Uf ) gives the maximal length of the sequence which
contains the operator Uf . Furthermore, let D = {f | l(Uf ) <
∞} ⊆ {1, . . . F}, i.e., the set of indices of the operators
that occur at least once in a finite length interval. Since F
is finite, there always exist an integer representing the length
of sequences in which each index f ∈ D appears at least once,
thereby fulfilling the admissibility condition in Definition 8.
Thus, by Lemmas 1 and 3, the iteration in (7) converges to
some x¯ ∈ ⋂f∈D fix(Uf ).
Let KL be the interval of a sequence containing L con-
secutive operators from the family {Uf}f∈D such that⋂
k∈KL fix(U
k) =
⋂
f∈D fix(Uf ). As we can choose an
arbitrarily long interval, without loss of generality, let L ≥ Q,
with Q being the integer in Assumptions 1 and 5. Then,
it holds that
⋂
k∈KL fix(U
k) ⊆ ⋂k∈KQ fix(Uk) because,
having a longer interval of operators can either reduce the
intersection set or leave it unchanged. Finally, by Lemma 5,⋂
k∈KQ fix(U
k) = A ∩ CN0 .
C. Discussion
Let us now visualize a proposal of an agent i in (7) by em-
ploying an over-projection operator, i.e., T ki = overprojC(vk)
which is a nonexpansive operator, see [[24], Prop. 4.2]. For
6brevity, let xˆki :=
∑N
j=1 w
k
i,jx
k
j . Then, the proposal of an
agent i reads as:
xk+1i = (1− αk)xki + αkoverprojC(vk)xˆki , (8)
where αk ∈ [, 1− ] for some  ∈ (0, 1/2].
In Figure 1, we illustrate an arbitrary instance of (8), where
the proposed payoff allocation xk+1i does not belong to the
instantaneous CORE C(vk) and hence it is not an acceptable
payoff, even for agent i. Nevertheless, as stated in Theorem 1,
repeated payoff allocations by all agents will eventually reach
an agreement on the payoff that belongs to the robust CORE
C0 in (5). Note that, in a payoff allocation process, interme-
diate allocation proposals can be irrational and therefore, the
adoption of this process by a rational agent shall be motivated,
e.g. via mechanism design, where a central authority provides
incentives to encourage cooperative behavior among agents
and in turn drives the process towards the desired equilibrium.
IV. DISTRIBUTED BARGAINING PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a distributed bargaining protocol
under a typical negotiation framework. Specifically, at iteration
k, each agent i ∈ I proposes a payoff distribution that belongs
to its negotiation set, referred to as the bounding set X ki in
(3). The intersection of these negotiation sets represents the set
of all plausible deals, i.e., the CORE and mutual agreement
of agents on one such deal concludes the bargaining process.
This struck deal corresponds to the final payoff distribution.
A. Distributed bargaining algorithm
For our distributed bargaining protocol, we use a similar
setup as the payoff allocation algorithm (III-A). Briefly, we
consider a set of agents I = {1, . . . , N}, each of whom
proposes a payoff distribution xki ∈ RN at each iteration
k ∈ N. These agents communicate over a sequence of time-
varying network graphs (Gk)k∈N, that satisfies Assumption
1, and the corresponding adjacency matrices (W k)k∈N satisfy
Assumptions 2 and 3.
During the negotiation, at each iteration k, an agent i first takes
an average of the estimates of neighboring agents xkj , j ∈ N ki ,
weighted by an adjacency matrix W k, and then applies an
operator Mki on the resulting average. Specifically, we propose
the following negotiation protocol for each agent i ∈ I:
xk+1i = M
k
i
(∑N
j=1 wi,jx
k
j
)
,
that is, in collective compact form,
xk+1 = Mk(W kxk), (9)
where Mk(x) := col(Mk1 (x1), . . . ,M
k
N (xN )) and W
k :=
W k ⊗ IN represents an adjacency matrix.
In (9) we require the operator Mki to be paracontraction,
not necessarily a nonexpansive operator as in (7). Utilizing
a paracontraction operator allows us to prove convergence of
our bargaining algorithm without the need of α−averaging
with the inertial term xk, as required for payoff allocation in
(7). Furthermore, in (9), we also require the fixed-point set
of Mki to be the bounding set in (3), i.e., fix(M
k
i ) = X ki .
Therefore, fix(Mk) =
⋂N
i=1 X ki = C(vk) and for a robust
coalitional game (I,V), it holds that ⋂vk∈V C(vk) = C0.
Assumption 6 (Paracontractions): For all k ∈ N, Mk
in (9) is such that Mk ∈ M, where M is a finite family
of paracontraction operators such that
⋂
M∈M fix(M) = CN0
with C0 being the robust CORE in (5). 
Similar to the payoff allocation setup, we also assume that
each Mk ∈M appears at least once in every Q iterations of
(9), with Q being the integer in Assumption 1.
Assumption 7: Let Q be the integer in Assumption 1. The
operators (Mk)k∈N in (9) are such that, for all n ∈ N,⋃n+Q
k=n {Mk} =M, with M as in Assumption 6. 
Next, we formalize the main convergence result of the bar-
gaining protocol in (9).
Theorem 2 (Convergence of bargaining protocol): Let
Assumptions 1−3, 6−7 hold. Then, the sequence (xk)∞k=0
generated by the iteration in (9) converges to some x¯ ∈
A ∩ CN0 , with A as in (6) and C0 being the robust CORE
(5). 
We now consider a special case of Theorem 2 where we
assume that there is a paracontraction operator M0 ∈ M,
whose fixed-points set corresponds to the robust CORE C0,
i.e., fix(M0) =
⋂
M∈M fix(M) = CN0 . This particular setting
corresponds to the robust game presented in [17], as mentioned
in Remark 1. We show next that the iteration in (9) under the
framework in Remark 1 converges to the set A∩ CN0 without
the need to postulate Assumption 7. Note that, to simplify the
analysis of the special case, in the following, we assume the
communication graph to be strongly connected.
Assumption 8: For all k ∈ N, Mk in (9) is such that Mk ∈
M with Mk = M0 infinitely often, for some M0 ∈M such
that fix(M0) = CN0 , where M satisfies Assumption 6 and C0
is the robust CORE in (5). 
Corollary 1: Let Assumption 1 hold with Q = 1. Let
Assumptions 2, 3 and 8 hold. Then, the sequence (xk)k∈N
generated by the iteration in (9) converges to some x¯ ∈ A∩CN0
with A as in (6) and C0 being the robust CORE (5). 
Note that, in the context of a robust game in Remark 1, the
fact that M0 appears infinitely often implies that vk = v holds
infinitely often, which is as an assumption in [17, Thm. 1].
B. Convergence Analysis
We prove the convergence of the bargaining protocol in
(9) by building upon a result related to the time-varying
paracontractions, presented in [25].
Lemma 6 ([25], Thm. 1): Let M be a finite family of
paracontractions such that
⋂
M∈M fix(M) 6= ∅. Then, the
sequence (xk)k∈N generated by xk+1 := Mk(xk) converges
to a common fixed-point of the paracontractions that occur
infinitely often in the sequence. 
In the following lemma, we provide a technical result about
the composition of paracontractions which we exploit later in
the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 7: Let Q be the integer in Assumption 1.
Let M1, . . . ,MQ be paracontraction operators with⋂Q
r=1 fix(M r) =: C and let WQWQ−1 · · ·W1 be the
composition of the adjacency matrices where Wr ∈ W , with
7W as in Assumption 3. Let W r := Wr ⊗ IN . Then, the
composed mapping x 7→ (MQWQ ◦ · · · ◦M1W 1)(x)
(i) is a paracontraction with respect to norm ‖ · ‖2,2;
(ii) fix(MQWQ ◦ · · · ◦M1W 1) = A ∩ C,
where A is the consensus set in (6). 
Proof: (i): It follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 4.
(ii): By Lemmas 2 and 4, fix(MQWQ ◦ · · · ◦M1W 1) =
fix(MQ)∩ · · · ∩fix(M1)∩fix(WQ)∩ · · · ∩fix(W 1). Again,
by Lemmas 2 and 4,
⋂Q
r=1 fix(W r) = fix(WQ · · ·W 1) and
since the composition WQ · · ·W 1 is strongly connected, by
the Perron-Frobenius theorem, fix(WQ · · ·W 1) = A. Finally,
as
⋂Q
r=1 fix(M r) = C, fix(MQWQ◦· · ·◦M1W 1) = A∩C.
Given these preliminary results, we are now ready to present
the proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
Proof: (Theorem 2) Let us define the sub-sequence of
xk for all k ∈ N as zt = x(t−1)Q for each t ≥ 2 with Q
being the integer in Assumptions 1 and 7. Then,
zt+1 = M tQ−1W tQ−1 ◦ · · · ◦M (t−1)QW (t−1)Qzt (10)
for t ≥ 2. It follows from assertion 1 of Lemma 7 that the
maps x 7−→ (M tQ−1W tQ−1 ◦ · · · ◦M (t−1)QW (t−1)Q)(x),
t ≥ 2 are all paracontractions. Also, under Assumption 3,
there can be only finitely many such maps. Furthermore, by
assertion 2 of Lemma 7, the set of fixed-points of each map
is A∩CN . Thus, by Lemma 6, the iteration in (10) converges
to some z¯ ∈ A ∩ CN .
Proof: (Corollary 1) It follows from Lemmas 2 and 4
that the iteration in (9) consists of a sequence of time-varying
paracontractions where, by Assumption 8, Mk = M0 occurs
infinitely often in the sequence. Again by Lemmas 2 and 4,
fix(MkW k) = fix(Mk) ∩ fix(W k). Thus, by Lemma 6 the
iteration in (9) converges to some x¯ ∈ fix(M0) ∩ fix(W k)
where fix(M0) =
⋂
M∈M fix(M) = CN0 . Furthermore, it
follows by the Perron-Frobenius theorem that for strongly
connected graphs, fix(W k) = A, regardless of the temporal
variation in W k. Thus, x¯ ∈ A ∩ CN0 .
C. Discussion
In our proposed bargaining process in (9), let Mk =
projXk , for all k ∈ N, which is a paracontraction [[24],
Prop. 4.16]. Then, the resulting iteration, i.e., xk+1 =
projXk(W
kxk) reduces to the bargaining protocol presented
in [17]. In that setup, the communication graphs and adjacency
matrices also satisfy our Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively.
The bargaining algorithm in [17] lies within our bargaining
framework, but with the exception that, in our setup, the
value function vk can only take finitely many values in a
bounded set. We emphasize that our framework provides an
agent with the flexibility to choose a paracontraction operator,
not necessarily a projection. This allows an agent to propose
a payoff on the boundary or in the interior of its bounding set.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present numerical illustrations of two
realistic scenarios modeled as coalitional games with uncertain
TABLE I: Coalitional values for the illustrative example
v({i}), i ∈ I v({1, 2}) v({1, 3}) v({2, 3}) v({1, 2, 3})
1 {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {3, 4, 5} 8
coalitional values. In the first scenario, we present a collab-
oration among three firms for providing abstract services; in
the second scenario, we simulate the motivational application
introduced in Section I. Our goal for presenting the former
is to illustrate the robust CORE and to differentiate between
the structure of payoff allocation and bargaining processes
during the negotiation stages. Therefore, we use only three
agents (firms) to be able to illustrate the outcome graphically
in dimension 2. Further, in the second simulation scenario, we
demonstrate a more comprehensive application, namely coop-
erative energy storage optimization in a smart grid framework.
A. Illustrative example
Consider three firms I = {1, 2, 3}, which individually
provide certain services to their customers. These firms can
improve their efficiency by collaborating activities and hence
generate a higher value. This collective value is a remuneration
of services agreed upon by a customer and the coalition of
firms in advance. To make this collaboration viable, all three
firms have to agree upon their share of the generated value.
The resulting scenario is a coalitional game among firms, a
solution to which is an agreed payoff distribution in the CORE.
The CORE allocation in (4) depends on the value of all
possible sub-coalitions. In our example, the firms know with
certainty about their individual values v({i}) and the value
of the grand coalition v(I), i.e., the final contract. However,
the sub-coalitions are never formed and hence their values are
unknown. We assume that the values of the sub-coalitions are
random within a bounded interval. Under the above conditions,
the coalitional game among the three firms takes the form of a
robust coalitional game. Thus, we can apply the robust payoff
distribution methods proposed in Sections III and IV.
The coalitional values of this coalitional game among firms
are given in Table I. For example, at each iteration k, the value
function of the coalition {1, 2}, i.e., v({1, 2}), takes its value
randomly from the set {2, 3, 4} with uniform probability. The
possibility of realizing only an integer value, with uniform
probability, satisfies the assumption of finite operator families
in Theorems 1−2 and also ensures that the resulting sequence
satisfies Assumption 5. Furthermore, we consider a fixed,
strongly connected communication graph which therefore sat-
isfies Assumptions 1−3. For the initial proposals, we assume
that each agent allocates entire value of coalition to itself,
e.g. the initial proposal by firm 1 will be x1(1) = [ 8 0 0 ]>.
Next, we evaluate the payoff distributions generated by payoff
allocation algorithm in (7) and the bargaining protocol in (9).
1) Distributed payoff allocation: For implementation, we
choose an over-projection operator, which is nonexpansive,
and the step size αk = 0.5 for all k ∈ N. The resulting iteration
for each agent i is as in (8). In Figure 2, we depict two arbitrary
instances of the CORE set C′ , C′′ and the robust CORE C0 in
(5). The allocation process in (7) converges to consensus on
8Fig. 2: Three instances of the CORE set, C0, C′ , C′′ and final
payoff allocation x¯.
Fig. 3: An instance of bargaining process showing the bound-
ing sets of the agents, X1, X2, X3, and the robust CORE
C0 =
⋂
i∈I Xi. x¯ is the final payoff vector.
the payoff allocation, x¯ = [2.4, 3, 2.6], which belongs to the
robust CORE, i.e., A∩CN0 . An allocation in the robust CORE
ensures that even under uncertainty on coalitional values, the
collaboration will emerge as the only rational choice. We note
that, in payoff allocation process each firm does not need to
have deterministic information of the CORE, which is weaker
from the usual assumption of coalitional games [26]. In fact,
here the firms only know the bounds on coalitional values.
2) Distributed bargaining protocol: We implement the it-
eration in (9), by using the projection operator, which is a
paracontraction and therefore, it satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem 2. In Figure 3, we show an arbitrary negotiation step
during the bargaining process. Here, a firm i agrees with the
payoff distribution only if it belongs to its bounding set Xi.
Thus, any mutually agreed payoff distribution must belong to
the intersection of bounding sets, i.e., C = ⋂i∈I Xi. Because
of the uncertainty in the values of sub-coalitions, the bounding
sets vary with iterations resulting in an instantaneous CORE
as in (4). The bargaining process in (9) ensures convergence
to the intersection of the instantaneous COREs, i.e., the robust
CORE C0 in (5). Thus, in our example, the resulting payoff
distribution x¯ = [2.33, 2.833, 2.833] belongs to the set A∩CN0 .
Compared with the payoff allocation process, the knowledge
requirement for the firms in the bargaining protocol is even
weaker. Here, the firms are required to know the bounds on the
values of their own sub-coalitions only, which is a reasonable
assumption for a cooperation scenario.
B. Cooperative energy storage optimization
In this subsection, we simulate the cooperative ES opti-
mization problem described in Section I as a motivational
example. We partially adapt the optimization setup from [18]
and, additionally, introduce uncertainty in the RES generation.
1) Problem setup: Consider N prosumers in an energy
coalition I, each equipped with RES generation and ES
system. Our goal is to cooperatively optimize ES systems, by
considering them as a single collective storage, for minimizing
the coalitional cost in (1) and, distribute the resulting cost sav-
ings, i.e., coalitional value in (2) among prosumers. Moreover,
the share of each prosumer, i.e., the payoff should belong to the
robust CORE in (5). We compute the coalitional value of each
coalition S ⊆ I for a time period of length K by solving a
linear optimization problem. We assume that the ES system of
each prosumer i has an energy capacity of ei ≥ 0, a charge and
discharge limit, bi ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0 respectively, a charge and
discharge efficiency ηchi and η
dc
i ∈ (0, 1), respectively. We also
consider an initial state of charge for each ES, SoC0i ∈ [0, 1]
where 1 represents a fully charged battery. We denote the
amount of energy stored and released from agent i’s ES during
time t be bt+i and b
t−
i , respectively.
Next, let us denote the vectors representing charge and dis-
charge energies of all prosumers by b− and b+. Moreover,
because of the difference in buying and selling prices of
electricity, let us divide the coalitional net load into a positive
part L+, which corresponds to the energy bought from the
grid, and a non-positive part L−, which represents the energy
sold to the grid. These four vectors are the decision variables
of our ES optimization problem that computes the coalitional
cost cK(S) for each coalition S ⊆ I as follows:
min
b+, b−,
L+, L−
K∑
t=1
{
ptb
∑
i∈S
Lt+i + p
t
S
∑
i∈S
Lt−i
}
(12a)
s.t. Lt−i ≤ 0 ≤ Lt+i (12b)∑
i∈S
(bt+i + b
t−
i + q
t
i) ≤
∑
i∈S
Lt+i (12c)∑
i∈S
(bt+i + b
t−
i + q
t
i) =
∑
i∈S
(Lt+i + L
t−
i ) (12d)
bi ≤ bt−i ≤ 0 ≤ bt+i ≤ bi (12e)
K∑
t=1
(
bt+i η
ch
i + b
t−
i /η
dc
i
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ S (12f)
0 ≤ eiSoC0i +
m∑
t=1
(
bt+i η
ch
i + b
t−
i /η
dc
i
) ≤ ei (12g)
∀i ∈ S,∀t ∈ [1,K],∀m ∈ [1,K].
The constraints (12e)−(12g) are related to the physical limi-
tations of ES systems. Specifically, (12e) represents the limi-
tation on the rate of charge/discharge of ES, (12g) represents
energy storage capacity of each ES and (12f) ensures that the
state of charge of each ES at the end of the horizon K is same
as the initial, i.e., SoCKi = SoC
0
i . For further details on this
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Fig. 4: (a) Sampled average of the trajectories of
dist(x(k),A ∩ CN0 )/dist(x(0),A ∩ CN0 ) for distributed allo-
cation algorithm with operator projCk for α = 1/5, 4/5 and
overprojCk for α = 1/5, 4/5. (b) Sampled average of selected
trajectories with spread of samples shown by shaded region.
formulation, we refer to [18].
To proceed, we introduce uncertainty in the net energy con-
sumption qti , since the generation of RES is uncertain. How-
ever, qti can only realize values from the interval [q
min
i , q
max
i ]
as explained in Section I. Here, these bounds refer to the
optimistic and conservative forecasts.
2) ES optimization as a robust coalitional game: Let
us now put the optimisation setup, presented above, in the
perspective of the payoff distribution problem. At the first
stage, the grand prosumer coalition I optimizes their energy
operation collectively via an aggregator over a time horizon of
length K and sells any expected excess of energy (available
at each time interval t) to the retailer. The coalition performs
this process in advance and gets remunerated by the retailer.
The additional value gained by the coalition as a result of the
cooperation is given by (2). At the second stage, the attained
coalitional value, i.e., v(I) is distributed among the agents so
that the payoff to each agent belongs to the robust CORE in
(5). Thus, for the payoff distribution, an aggregator computes
the value v(S) for all S ⊂ I by solving the optimization
problem presented above. To account for the uncertainty in
the RES generation, the aggregator computes the bounds on
the coalitional values as vk(S) ≤ vK(S) ≤ vk(S), S ⊂ I and
communicates the vector v containing these bounds to all the
agents, who in turn initiate the payoff distribution process.
This scenario, with uncertainty, requires robust solution and
thus demonstrates practicality of our distributed allocation and
bargaining algorithms. Furthermore, the CORE set is not sin-
gleton and different CORE payoffs can favour different agents.
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Fig. 5: (a) Sampled average of the trajectories of
dist(x(k),A ∩ CN0 )/dist(x(0),A ∩ CN0 ) for distributed bar-
gaining with operator projXk and TXk := (1−β)projXk(·)+
βoverprojXk(·) for β = 1/5, 4/5. (b) Sampled average of
trajectories with spread of samples shown by shaded region.
Therefore, the possibility of biased behavior of the aggregator
can render a central computation of the payoffs unacceptable
for prosumers. Thus, presented application further appreciates
the distributed structure of the proposed algorithms.
3) Simulations studies: For the numerical simulation, we
select a time horizon of K = 6 hours. Each prosumer i is
equipped with the battery of energy capacity ei = 7 kWh, a
maximum charge power bi = 3.5 kW, a maximum discharge
power bi = 3.5 kW, both charge and discharge efficiencies of
ηchi = η
dc
i = 95% and an initial state of charge SoC
0
i = 50%.
We put the bounds of optimistic and conservative forecast
on the RES generation of each agent for production hours
and randomly generate net consumption scenarios. We then
evaluate the coalitional value in (2) for each scenario and
compute the bounds vk(S) and vk(S), S ⊂ I. We then run
100 different trajectories of payoff distribution processes. We
assume, for each trajectory, that agents initially allocate the
whole value v(I) to themselves. We also assume a strongly
connected communication graph between the agents and allow
finite set of points between the bounds vk(S) and vk(S), to
satisfy Assumption 5 for Theorems 1 and 2 to hold true.
Moreover, for the distributed allocation process in (7), the
whole coalitional value vector v is communicated to the agents
whereas, for the bargaining process in (9) only the value of
agent’s own coalitions are communicated. Finally, the agents
initiate a robust coalitional game to reach the consensus on a
payoff which belongs to the robust CORE in (5). This payoff
guarantees the stability of the grand coalition which in turn
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has considerable operational benefits for the power grid [2].
We first report the numerical results for the distributed al-
location process. In Figure 4a, we compute the average of
the sample trajectories obtained by 100 runs and report the
normalized distances dist(x(k), C0 ∩ A)/dist(x(0), C0 ∩ A),
for the projection and over-projection operators, by varying the
parameter α. We can observe that an over-projection operator
with higher value of α results in faster convergence. In Figure
4b, we provide the spread of the sample trajectories to depict
the best and worst convergence scenarios in our sample set.
Lastly, we simulate the distributed bargaining process in (9)
and report the average of the sample trajectories. In Figure
5a, we show the comparison of the normalized distances.
We conduct the analysis by utilizing the projection operator
and the convex combination of projection and over-projection
operators, i.e., TXk := (1−β)projXk(·)+βoverprojXk(·) for
varying β. Both the operators are paracontraction operators
[24]. Figure 5b shows the spread of the sample trajectories.
VI. CONCLUSION
For robust coalitional games over the time-varying commu-
nication networks, distributed payoff allocation and bargaining
algorithms based on nonexpansive and paracontraction oper-
ators, e.g. over-projections, and network averaging converge
consensually to the robust CORE, even under time-varying
coalition values.
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